Introduction
The purpose of this study is to investigate whether, and possibly how, audit quality and audit pricing vary between audit firms and audit offices. We study quality and pricing in the private audit market and use disciplinary sanctions as the measure of audit quality. 1 We expect an inverse relationship between high audit quality and the propensity of being subject to disciplinary sanctions.
As sanctions are issued against auditors who do not meet the required standards, we will identify auditors at the lower end of a low-high quality continuum. Prior studies have focused on the association between office size and audit quality in publicly listed companies (e.g., Francis and Yu 2009; Choi et al. 2010) . The association between office size and audit quality in unlisted companies is a topic that has not yet been researched. The main contributions of this study are an analysis of unlisted companies and an analysis of the association between audit quality and office size for different categories of audit firms.
This study uses data from Sweden. The advantage of using Swedish data is that disciplinary sanctions against individual auditors are available which allows us to link sanctions to audit offices and audit firms. Another important characteristic is the statutory audit requirement for all limited companies. Following this requirement, auditors have on average a large number of relatively small audit assignments. 2 Consequently, there are large numbers of small audit firms and the major audit firms have established local offices in every region of the country. The major audit firms also have a significant market share in the private company segment. Thus, an investigation into how the size of the audit firm and the size of the audit office are associated with disciplinary sanctions and audit fees in the Swedish private firm audit market is warranted for a variety of reasons.
First, prior studies on audit quality have frequently used measures of earnings management as the indicator of audit quality (e.g., Vander Bauwhede and Willekens 2004; Francis and Yu 2009; Choi et al. 2010) . These measures are based on components of financial statements and reflect the joint efforts of management and auditors. It is inherently difficult to separate audit effects from the management's accounting practices. Also, in contrast to using disciplinary sanctions, it is not possible to say anything about the absolute level of audit quality or determine whether audit performance is below standard (Francis and Yu 2009) . Decisions regarding disciplinary sanctions taken by the Supervisory Body of Public Accountants (SBPA) in Sweden are based on a broad range of quality aspects of both the audit process and professional conduct. Disciplinary sanctions are only concerned with auditor conduct and are a consequence of sub-standard performance in one or (typically) multiple audit assignments. While recognising that SBPA does not capture all the cases of audit failure, it is reasonable to assume that sanctions become much more likely if the quality of services is low. Ultimately, disciplinary sanctions have the advantage over earnings management indicators in that they provide a direct measure of absolute audit quality.
Second, although extensive literature is available about audit and price differences between Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors for listed companies (Becker et al.1998; Kim et al. 2003; Choi et al. 2010) , significantly less research has been carried out on privately owned unlisted companies (Maijoor and Vanstraelen 2006; Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen 2008) . In general, empirical evidence from European private firms provides rather weak support for superior quality among Big 4 audit firms. The available literature has almost solely focused on the Big 4/non-Big 4 dichotomy.
However, there are some non-Big 4 audit firms that also belong to international networks. From the existing research on private firms it is not clear whether those auditors provide the same quality as Big 4 auditors. We therefore complement the existing literature on quality differentiation at firm level by specifically studying the quality and pricing of the fifth and sixth largest audit firms in Sweden, namely Grant Thornton and BDO. In this study, we use 'Top 6 auditors' when collectively referring to the Big 4 audit firms and Grant Thornton and BDO as one category of auditors.
Third, the evidence pertaining to the association between audit office size and audit quality is based on listed companies. Francis and Yu (2009) studied the effects of office size using a sample of Big 4 audited listed companies. Choi et al. (2010) studied samples of Big 4 and non-Big 4 listed companies, but did not study the association between office size and audit quality separately for the categories. The suggested reasons for an association between audit office size and audit quality are that larger offices have more collective experience, more peers with whom to consult and greater inhouse expertise than smaller ones (Francis and Yu 2009) . However, audit office effects might be even more apparent in assignments in private companies, because in such cases auditor are then conducted by, in the one extreme, sole practitioners working alone in their offices and, in the other extreme, by auditors based at large offices of Top 6 audit firms. The lack of opportunities to harness expertise from other offices implies that audit office effects are even more prevalent in non-Top 6 audit firms. In this study, we analyse office effects separately for Top 6 and non-Top 6 audit firms.
Briefly, our results suggest that there is a quality differentiation in the Swedish audit market.
We analysed three categories of audit firms: i) Big 4, ii) Grant Thornton and BDO and iii) non-Top 6 and found that the likelihood of a disciplinary sanction is significantly higher for auditors from non-Top 6 audit firms than those from Top 6 firms. The fees of Top 6 auditors are also significantly higher. Furthermore, among the non-Top 6 auditors, there is a significant negative association between the likelihood of a disciplinary sanction and the size of the audit office, which suggests that a larger collective competence and in-house expertise is positively associated with audit quality.
Our results also show that fees are positively associated with audit office size.
The remainder of the study is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the Swedish institutional setting. Section 3 contains the hypotheses. Section 4 includes the research design and the data. Section 5 presents the empirical results and section 6 concludes the study.
Institutional setting and disciplinary sanctions in Sweden
The Eighth Directive of the European Union (EU 2006) gives member states the right to exempt smaller entities from the statutory audit requirement. 3 Up to November 2010 Sweden had not used this possibility, but instead required all limited liability companies to be audited (Companies Act, Chapter 9, para.1). However, the Swedish Parliament (Riksdagen) has now decided to exempt the smallest firms from the audit requirement (Swedish Government, 2010) . 4 In addition to the 330,000
limited liability companies that are audited annually following the Company Act, auditing is also required in some other organisational forms. 5 The sample used in this study covers the period when all companies had to be audited regardless of their size. 9 However, there are also a large number of sole proprietors on the market.
It should also be noted that in Sweden audit firms can be found throughout the country and there are a large number of local offices.
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The Eighth Directive (EU 2006) states that the monitoring system of auditors must rest on two pillars: effective sanctions and public disclosure of sanctions. However, there is considerable leeway for national differences in terms of monitoring. In Sweden, SBPA is responsible for monitoring approved and authorised auditors. SBPA is a governmental authority under the Ministry of Justice that arranges exams, issues approval or authorisation, supervises and investigates and decides on disciplinary sanctions and other measures against auditors and registered public accounting firms. The overall function of SBPA is to ensure that professional ethics for accountants and generally accepted auditing standards are developed in an appropriate way.
The most important task of SBPA is the supervision of auditors and audit firms. SBPA conducts quality control investigations, both on its own initiative and after having received complaints, with the purpose of ensuring the level of audit quality and reporting quality. Their own investigations have two forms: regular quality inspection and inspections directed at high risk groups. SBPA carries out regular inspections on auditors with public clients every third year. The regular quality inspection of auditors without public assignments has been delegated to FAR and takes place every sixth year. However, SBPA is involved in designing the investigations (scope, orientation, methodology etc.) and decides on the required qualifications for individuals conducting the inspections. SBPA also performs random checks on a sample of the inspections performed by FAR. FAR has to report to SBPA if major deficiencies are identified during an inspection, or if a member refuses an inspection. 11 If any of the inspections performed by SBPA reveal substantial drawbacks, or if a major deficiency is reported by FAR, a disciplinary investigation will be opened.
Importantly, SBPA also receives complaints that lead to investigations and disciplinary cases. These complaints can come from clients, banks, shareholders, trade partners, the Swedish Economic Crime Agency, the Swedish Enforcement Agency, tax authorities and others. In the period 2005-2009, disciplinary sanctions were issued against approximately 6.9 % of the qualified auditors. 13 Incentives to perform high audit quality and thereby reduce the risk of being subject to sanctions are likely to be related to the costs associated with sanctions. However, the extent to which negative consequences follow on from a reprimand or warning is somewhat debatable. According to SBPA chief Peter Strömberg, large audit firms have mechanisms in place that are supposed to ensure reduced compensation for an auditor who is subject to sanctions (Bursell 2010) . Sanctions are also believed to be associated with negative reputation effects. 
Literature and hypothesis development

Audit failures, audit quality and independent oversight
Basically, the value of auditing stems from the auditor detecting and correcting/revealing material misstatements in the financial information presented. Audit quality can be conceptualised as a continuum ranging from very low to very high audit quality (see Francis 2004, p.346) . At the very low end of the quality continuum we have (outright) audit failures. Basically audit failures fall into two categories: when generally accepted accounting principles are not enforced by the auditor (GAAP failure) and when an auditor fails to issue an accurate report (audit report failure). For the auditor who regularly delivers high quality, the risk of such failures will be substantially reduced compared to an auditor performing at low quality. In other words, there is an inverse relationship between audit failure and high audit quality (see Palmrose 1988; Francis 2004) . Failures can be identified from litigations, oversight quality inspections and restatements (see Francis 2004) .
Researchers have recognised the usefulness of self-regulated peer reviews and independent oversight inspections for signalling perceived and actual audit quality (Palmrose 1988; Hilary and Lennox 2005; Casterella et al. 2009; Van de Poel et al. 2009 ). As the auditing profession globally has recently switched from self-regulation to independent oversight, research on public oversight is still in its infancy. US based research on the effectiveness of public oversight provides somewhat mixed evidence. For example, Lennox and Pittman (2010) found audit firm market shares to be insensitive to the content of PCAOB reports, while Carcello et al. (2011) showed that PCAOB inspections resulted in a reduction of client's earnings management. Recent research undertaken in Europe into the monitoring of auditors indicates that public oversight is effective in signalling audit quality. Based on data from the Netherlands, Van de Poel et al. (2009) will not be properly enforced (GAAP failure).
A potential drawback with disciplinary sanctions is that it is not possible to link performance to the characteristics of a specific client. However, we should note that such matching is not fully relevant, as sanctions are largely issued as a result of multiple deficiencies in several different assignments. The quality measure will basically distinguish between auditors who find it difficult to meet quality standards and those who do not. In order to minimise the risk of findings being influenced by large firms with greater resources being more active in fighting sanctions (see Feroz et al. 1991) , we analyse cases in which a disciplinary sanction has been filed. However, we do not consider whether the sanction is subject to an appeal or the potential outcome of such an appeal. Also, decisions about disciplinary cases are taken by a group of qualified professionals with the relevant expertise, including judges in the Court of Appeal. Sanctions should not be issued without sufficient evidence of significant deficiencies in audit or professional conduct.
While not all audit failures or significant quality deficiencies are revealed in disciplinary cases, it is reasonable to expect that the likelihood of sanctions increases with lower service quality.
This suggests that auditors with no disciplinary sanction activity could be viewed as a high quality supplier, and that auditors that have been subject to sanctions could be viewed as low quality suppliers (see Palmrose 1988, p.56 ).
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Audit quality differentiation between audit firms and audit offices
Using various proxies for audit quality, empirical research provides strong evidence in favour of Big 4 auditors performing higher quality audits than non-Big 4 auditors in the (US) public firm market (Kim et al. 2003; Choi et al. 2010) . However, the European evidence on quality differentiation is based solely on earnings management proxies and the results are weaker than in US studies ( should be more motivated to maintain high quality and thereby avoid the need for tax authorities to file complaints and a damaged reputation.
The basic competence and independence arguments for quality differentiation between large and small audit firms as first presented by DeAngelo (1981) do not imply that it is necessarily just the current Big 4 auditors that are capable of performing higher quality than other smaller auditors. 15 Possibly the most important characteristic of the large audit firms are membership of international audit firm networks. Affiliates of those networks are subject to quality assurance and internal quality reviews and share common methodology and practice rules that generate economies of scale (Lenz and James 2007) . Auditors that do not meet quality standards put the reputation of the whole network at risk, thus creating strong incentives to maintain quality levels and avoid substandard performance being exposed in disciplinary cases. We find the Big 4 audit firms, BDO and Grant Thornton among the leading international audit networks. In belonging to a major international network, we expect that auditors at Grant Thornton and BDO, at least in the local private audit market in Sweden, are motivated and have sufficient resources to perform audits of the same quality as the Big 4 auditors. We therefore suggest one relevant audit quality distinction between 'Top 6 auditors' and other auditors, rather than (or in addition to) Big 4 auditors versus non-Big 4 auditors.
Next, we need to consider a potential office affect on audit quality. Recent evidence
suggests that audit quality is not uniform within the same audit firm, i.e. there are national, regional and city-based differences. Given that large audit firms have invested heavily in preserving their image and reputation, they have an incentive to maintain a homogenous level of service quality (Choi et al. 2010) . These large firms use standardised approaches to methodology, techniques and programmes worldwide in order to achieve this ambition. However, some dimensions of audit work make it difficult to uphold a homogenous quality at firm level. Despite having access to standardised audit approaches, complex auditing decisions are ultimately judgemental and taken by individuals or groups of individuals, and as such are likely to vary between firms and offices. We should here note that the local audit office has (typically) its own client base (Choi et al. 2010) and constitutes an independent profit centre. Studies of listed firms have documented that the size of the city-based office is an important determinant of audit quality (Reynolds and Francis 2000; Francis and Yu 2009; Choi et al. 2010) . Francis and Yu (2009) investigated Big 4 offices in the US and, based on an auditor's propensity to issue a going concern report and earnings management benchmarks, found evidence of larger offices producing higher quality audits. Choi et al. (2010) studied a sample of both Big 4 audit clients (79 %) and non-Big 4 audit clients (21 %) and documented a positive association between audit offices size, quality (abnormal accruals) and price (abnormal audit fees). However, they did not examine whether there were differences in quality measures between the sub-samples of large and small audit firms. Interestingly, issues related to the existence of quality differentiation between different non-Big 4 auditors have received little attention in the literature. Niemi (2004) is a notable exception here. He studied the hourly billing rate for a sample of 103 Finnish self-employed auditors and found that the rates were positively associated with experience and the size of the auditor's business.
The size of the audit firm implies different opportunities for auditors to take part in courses, seminars and other training activities outside their local office. However, such 'formal' opportunities to improve competence levels only reflect one aspect of audit quality. We suggest that something that is possibly even more important is auditors' daily exposure to internal input from colleagues and external expertise. Larger firms and offices have established systems for internal reviews of ongoing and completed audit work and accordingly arrange seminars so that experts can come and present new or updated standards, laws, guidelines, techniques and programmes on a regular basis, e.g. lunch meetings. Quality enhancing activities like these are either few and far between or non-existent in smaller firms or offices.
We argue that being continuously updated about the latest in the field and being challenged by colleagues improves an auditor's motivation and facilitates learning and quality improvements.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that internal reviews are taken very seriously and that applied quality demands among the Big 4 firms exceed the minimum requirements imposed during SBPA inspections. In addition, valuable opportunities to informally ask one or several experienced colleagues should not be underestimated. Larger offices have a greater pool of capable audit personnel who can share their understandings of and knowledge about the business operations and internal control systems of clients (see Choi et al. 2010) . The possibilities of having one's own work formally or informally reviewed by colleagues is likely to vary between audit firms and audit offices. One possible consequence of a lack of such possibilities is a higher proportion of sub-standard audits. Based on the discussion above, our first hypothesis relates to the association between audit firm-size, audit office size and audit quality. Our hypotheses in alternative form are:
H1a:
There is a negative association between audit firm size and the likelihood of a disciplinary sanction.
H1b:
There is a negative association between audit office size and the likelihood of a disciplinary sanction.
Audit pricing and the size of audit firms and audit offices
In the professional services market, higher service quality is typically associated with a higher price (see Tirole 1990) . After controlling for client characteristics affecting audit fees, such as size, complexity and auditor-client risk sharing, empirical studies relating to listed firms document that Big 4 earn a fee premium that is relative to other audit firms (Simunic 1980; Craswell et al. 1995; DeFond et al. 2000; Ferguson et al. 2003) . The reported Big 4 premium is on average around 20 % (Francis 2004) . Basically, higher price may be due to either the amount of audit effort invested (more audit hours) or greater expertise (higher price per hour). However, the extent to which private firms are willing to pay more for higher (expected) audit quality is largely unknown.
The use of high quality auditors (i.e. Big 4 auditor) is suggested to signal management's honesty and integrity to investors and creditors (Hay and Davis 2004) . It has also been documented that, on average, private firms audited by a Big 4 auditor have lower cost of capital (Berry and Robertson 2006; Karjalainen 2011) . As the findings indicate economic benefits from using high quality auditors, one would expect that (some) firms would be willing to pay extra for that higher quality.
Some factors could make it possible for larger offices to charge a lower price than smaller offices. For example, audit-related overhead costs allocated to individual clients could be lower, given that larger offices typically have a larger clientele. However, Choi et al. (2010) documented a positive association between audit office size and price (abnormal audit fees) for sub-samples of Big 4 and non-Big 4 clients. They concluded that quality differentiation was priced as a fee premium in the audit market. Audit pricing studies also show that office levels in general have an impact on audit fees. Ferguson et al. (2003) and Francis et al. (2005) found that city specific, officelevel industry leadership, when combined with national-level leadership, generated the highest fee premiums. To the extent that audit office size is positively associated with audit quality, we predict that the greater the size of the office the higher the audit quality will be, and that as a result the audit fee will also be higher. Our hypotheses in alternative form are:
H2a: There is a positive association between audit firm size and audit fees.
H2b: There is a positive association between audit office size and audit fees.
Sample and research design
Data
We used two samples to test our hypothesis. The first sample consisted of disciplinary sanctions against auditors. We collected data relating to all the disciplinary sanctions imposed by the SBPA We measured audit firm size with indicator variables based on the size of the audit firm and audit office size when testing both hypotheses. Information about audit firms and office affiliation for all auditors in Sweden was retrieved from files provided by SBPA. These files summarised the office affiliation of auditors at the end of 2009. However, in order to detect employees that had started to work for another audit firm we checked whether the affiliation of the auditors was the same in the disciplinary case files. Very few auditors had a different affiliation in 2009 than in the disciplinary case files, indicating that employee switches are rare after the initiation of a disciplinary case.
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Research design
Likelihood of disciplinary sanctions Hypothesis 1 predicted that audit quality was associated with audit firm size and office size. The following multinomial logistic regressions were estimated to test whether firm and office sizes were associated with the likelihood of a disciplinary sanction:
(1) Ln[P(SANCTION=m) / P(SANCTION=0)] = β 0m + β 1m *LNOFFICESIZE + β 2m *GT/BDO + β 3m *NON TOP 6 + β 4m *AUDAGE + ε 
AUDAGE:
Age of the auditor-in-charge in years.
Two measures of sanctions were used. The first was based on disciplinary sanctions as a consequence of deficiencies in the audit process or auditors' reporting; a group that consisted of about 75 % of all disciplinary cases (see Table 1 ). The second was based on all the disciplinary sanctions during the time period studied. Auditors without a disciplinary sanction were placed in the base-category in the multinomial logistic regressions.
The calculation of LNOFFICESIZE was based on data retrieved from the Supervisory Board It can be seen from Table 2 that most of the auditors at the Top 6 audit firms work at fairly large offices, whereas about the half of the auditors at the non-Top 6 audit firms work at offices with only one or two authorised auditors. In regression 2 we exclude LNOFFICESIZE and replace NON TOP 6 with NON TOP 6-Large and NON TOP 6-Small. NON TOP 6-Large takes the value 1 if there are more than 2 authorised auditors at the office and NON TOP 6-Small takes the value 1 if there are only one or two authorised auditors at the office. The cut-off is based on the median value of auditors at the offices of non-Top 6 audit firms. Auditors at small offices of non-Top 6 firms also have limited possibilities to consult peers at the office nationally, which may have a negative impact on audit quality. AUDAGE was included in order to control for a reduced incentive of effort and participation in training activities by older employees (cf. Kubeck et al. 1996; Holmström 1999) . In order to study office size for both large and small audit firms, we ran regression 1 separately on Top 6 audited firms and non-Top 6 audited firms. As the sample sizes were small when we split the sample, binary logistic regressions were used in which all types of sanctions were merged into one category.
Audit pricing
In order to test hypothesis two, relating to the effect of firm size and office size on audit fees, we used the following OLS regressions. The control variables in the regression were mainly based on Hope and Langli (2010) , who studied fees for a sample of privately held Norwegian companies. 
LNSALES:
Natural logarithm of sales.
LNEMPLOY: Natural logarithm of number of employees.
SOLV:
Shareholders' equity to total assets.
CHSOLV:
SOLV t less SOLV t-1 (t is the year of the study).
INVREC:
Inventory and receivables divided by total assets.
GROWTH:
Natural logarithm of revenues year t less the natural logarithm of revenues year t-1.
ROA:
Return on assets.
CURRATIO: Current assets to current liabilities.
FYE:
1 if the balance sheet date is the end of December and 0 otherwise.
GROUP:
1 if the company is a parent company or a subsidiary and 0 otherwise.
LOSS:
1 if earnings are less than zero and 0 otherwise.
LNCOMPAGE:
Natural logarithm of the age of the company in years.
AUDAGE:
Age of the auditor-in-charge. season at the beginning of a new year, which may in turn increase audit fees.
An indicator variable taking the value one if the company is the parent company or a subsidiary was included in order to control for the increased complexity of groups (GROUP). If a company belongs
to a group the auditor either has to audit the group accounts or to communicate with the auditors of the parent company. We also included the age of the auditor (AUDAGE) in order to control for possible competence and experience effects on audit pricing. Finally, we controlled for possible industry effects and regional differences in audit pricing by including 4 industry indicators and 20 indicator variables for regional provinces. Region was deemed an important control variable due to the largest offices being in the Stockholm area and a couple of other large Swedish cities. Audit fees may also be higher in larger cities due to the higher costs of audit firms. We also explored the effects of region on our main results in supplementary analyses. Some of the variables in our audit fee data have extreme values. We winsorised SOLV, CHSOLV, GROWTH, ROA and CURRATIO with 1 % in the upper tail and 1 % in the lower tail.
Results
Likelihood of disciplinary sanctions
Univariate evidence on the association between our test variables and disciplinary sanctions is presented in Table 3 . Table 4 includes multinomial logistic regressions and in Table 5 we present the results for binary regressions separately for auditors employed by Top 6 and non-Top 6 audit firms.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
In Table 3 A further observation that can be made from the table is that auditors who have received a sanction are much older than auditors in general. The median age of the auditors without a sanction is 46 years. 18 The median ages of the auditors who received a reprimand, a warning and were excluded from the profession are 54 years, 55 years and 58 years respectively. Older auditors also work in smaller offices. The Spearman rank correlation between AUDAGE and LNOFFICESIZE is -0.362 (prob-value < 0.001).
[Insert Table 4 about here] Four regressions are reported in Table 4 On average auditors at non-Top 6 firms work at much small offices than auditors at Top 6 audit firms (see Table 2 ). We used two approaches in an attempt to separate audit firm effects from audit office size. First, in order to study whether there were differences in the likelihoods of disciplinary sanctions between auditors at small and large offices of non-Top 6 audit firms, we Second, we estimated the likelihood of sanctions separately for the sub-samples of Top 6
and non-Top 6 auditors. In order to avoid estimating regressions with few observations per category, we used binary regressions in which the dependent variable took the value one if the auditor had received a reprimand, a warning or had been excluded from the profession and zero otherwise. The binary logit results are reported in Table 5 . It can be seen that there is a significant negative association between audit office size and the likelihood of disciplinary sanctions for nonTop 6 auditors. However, the association is insignificant among auditors at Top 6 firms. 19 Thus, by using the likelihood of disciplinary sanctions as an indicator of audit quality, the results in the tables suggest that particularly among non-Top 6 auditors, auditors at small offices conduct audits of lower quality than auditors at larger offices. No significant differences in the likelihood of a disciplinary sanction between auditors at Big 4 firms and auditors at Grant Thornton or BDO could be identified.
Thus, the results show that large audit firms are less likely to receive a sanction, which supports hypothesis 1a. Hypothesis 1b predicted a positive association between audit office size and the likelihood of disciplinary sanctions. The results support the existence of such an association for non-Top 6 audit firms, which means that we received partial support for hypothesis 1b.
[Insert Table 5 about here] A final noteworthy finding in Tables 4 and 5 is that the likelihood of disciplinary sanctions increases significantly with the age of the auditor. AUDAGE has positive coefficients that are significant at the 0.01 level in all the regressions. This result is contrary to prior studies, which
show that experience improves audit quality. A possible reason for this is that older auditors have fewer incentives to conduct high quality audits or to participate in continuing education activities. 
Firm size, office size and audit fees
The results reported in the previous section suggest that, in particular, auditors at small non-Top 6 firms conduct audit work of a lower quality than other auditors. If a lower audit quality is an effect of lower audit effort, one would expect similar associations in regressions on audit fees. This section presents the results related to the second hypothesis of the study predicting positive associations between audit firm size, audit office size and audit fees. Table 6 includes the OLS regression results. The data consists of 952 companies audited by 732 auditors. 21 Since the data includes multiple observations on some auditors, we report White standard errors that are robust to within auditor-cluster correlation (Rogers 1993) . The correlations between the independent variables in the regressions are below 0.7 with the following exception:
the correlation between LNSALES and LNEMPLOY is 0.84.
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Two regressions are reported in the table. Both models are highly significant and have Rsquares around 55 %. This is somewhat lower than in audit fees' studies of publicly traded companies, but at the same level as prior studies of privately held companies. For example, Hope and Langli (2010), who studied audit fees for privately held Norwegian companies, report Rsquares around 54 %.
[Insert Table 6 [Insert Table 7 about here]
Results in which we run the models separately on companies audited by Top 6 and non-Top 6 auditors are presented in Table 7 . Here it can be seen that audit fees are positively associated with LNOFFICESIZE when companies are audited by Top 6 and non-Top 6 auditors. However, the coefficient is significant, at the 0.10 level, only for the sub-sample of non-Top 6 audited firms.
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Our data includes observations from different regions in Sweden. We include regional variables as controls for possible differences in price levels between different regions and these results indicate that fees are higher in the Stockholm area than in other regions. The largest offices are also located in Stockholm. In order to further explore whether office size effects is driven by regional price level differences, we estimated the regressions in Table 6 negative and significant at the 0.05 level in regression 2. Thus, some of the significance levels were lower when the data was split, but the main findings hold when the Stockholm area and other areas were analysed separately. Indeed, one observation that can be made from these analyses is that the positive and marginally significant association between audit fees and GT/BDO in Table 6 is driven by observations outside the Stockholm area.
In sum, the empirical results in the section give partial support for hypothesis 2a and 2b.
Hypothesis 2b predicted a positive association between audit office size and audit fees. We found a strong positive association for our entire sample, although the separate analysis of Top 6 and nonTop 6 auditors indicates that the association is stronger for non-Top 6 auditors. Related to hypothesis 2a and audit firm pricing, we find that auditors at especially small non-Top 6 firms charge lower fees than Top 6 auditors.
Conclusions
This study contributes to the literature on audit quality in private companies. Issues related to audit quality differentiation in the private component segment is of interest for the European Union (EU)
as well as other markets with statutory audits. The statutory audit requirement provides different incentives for both auditors and companies compared to a voluntary audit setting. For example, in a recent study of U.K. companies Lennox and Pittman (2012) found that when audits were mandatory, companies with a small perceived demand for audits, that chose not be audited in a voluntary setting, selected low quality auditors. Our study contributes to the audit quality literature by studying the supply-side of the audit market. Unlike most of the previous research, which indirectly proxies for audit quality by using e.g. discretionary accruals (e.g. Francis and Yu 2009),
we measure audit quality with disciplinary sanctions against auditors, since this is arguably a more direct measure of audit quality.
The first and most important contribution of this study is that it shows how audit quality varies with audit office size. We found that there was a significant positive association between audit office size and audit quality for non-Top 6 audit firms but not for Top 6 audit firms, which suggests that the larger collective competence and in-house expertise at the office is particularly important in small audit firms. The results imply that the quality delivered by small audit firms is more heterogeneous than that from large audit firms and that small offices with little external input, find it harder to meet the quality requirements. A possible reason for the insignificant association between audit office size and quality in Top 6 firms is that the lack of in-office expertise and competence can be compensated for by contacts with other offices. Overall, the findings indicate that the office level is an important unit of analysis of audit quality in private companies.
The second contribution of this study is that there are only small quality differences between Big 4 audit firms and BDO and Grant Thornton as the fifth and sixth largest audit firms in Sweden.
The findings suggest that in private firm market, these auditors are capable of performing at similar audit quality level as Big 4 auditors. As members of large international networks, auditors at BDO and Grant Thornton, are motivated to maintain their quality levels, because if they did not they would jeopardise the reputation of the entire network. However, our results show that the likelihood of a disciplinary sanction against the auditor is significantly higher if he or she is employed by a non-Top 6 audit firm than by a Top 6 audit firm. The audit firm size hypothesis of DeAngelo (1981) has frequently been used as the rationale for the Big 4/non-Big 4 dichotomy in the literature (e.g.
Karjalainen 2011
). Our results thus underline the need to go beyond the Big 4 versus non-Big 4 dichotomy when audit firm size hypotheses are tested. Future research into private firms may confirm whether findings relating to the association between categories of audit firms and audit quality are generalisable to other jurisdictions.
Our third contribution relates to whether audit quality is priced at the market for private companies. Generally, our results suggest that larger audit firms charge higher fees. The results
show that auditors at non-Top 6 auditors at small offices charge the lowest fees. Findings suggest that companies are also willing to pay for high quality services for private firm audits. The separate analyses of Top 6 and non-Top 6 audit firms also show that the positive association between office size and fees is moderately significant for the sub-sample of non-Top 6 auditors. Thus, the results of the study show that the associations between fees and our test variables are largely similar, as are the associations between our quality measure and the test variables, thus suggesting that quality and price are associated.
Overall, this study contributes to our understanding of audit quality differentiation in a market with statutory audits. The findings suggest that some auditors at small audit firms and audit offices trade-off price for quality in order to meet the demand for low quality audits; something that is reflected in relatively high proportions of audit failures, i.e. disciplinary sanctions, and low audit fees. The degree to which quality differentiation is mainly driven by differences in incentives or capabilities of auditors could be addressed in future research. Some auditors have been involved in multiple disciplinary cases and these are sometimes related. In the right-hand column these cases are considered as two separate cases. In the left hand column an auditor is included only once in the figures. If an auditor has been involved in several disciplinary cases, the classification is first of all based on the more severe case (e.g. the warning if an auditor has received both a warning and a reminder). A goal with the study is to investigate how audit quality is related to the background characteristics of auditors. The audit quality related sanctions are classified according to whether an auditor has been involved in a case related to the audit process or reporting. For example, if an auditor has been involved in an audit process case and an independence case, it is classified as an audit process case in the left-hand column. The identity of the initiator was not available in the files examined for one disciplinary case. *, **, *** denote p-value < 10 percent, < 5 percent, and < 1 percent, respectively, with two-tailed tests. Multivariate logistic regression results are reported and the dependent variable takes the value one if the auditor has received a reprimand, two for warnings, three for exclusions from the profession by SBPA and zero for no disciplinary sanctions. All t-statistics in parentheses are calculated using White's (1980) method to correct for heteroskedasticity.
TABLE 5
Audit office size and the likelihood of a disciplinary action for Top 6 and non-Top 6 auditors Regressions 1 and 3: LnP[(SANCTION=1) / P(SANCTION=0)] = β 0 + β 1 *LNOFFICESIZE + β 2 *AUDAGE+ ε Regressions 2 and 4:
LnP[(SANCTION=1) /P (SANCTION=0)] = β 0 + β 1 *LNOFFICESIZE + β 2 *GT/BDO + β 3 *AUDAGE + ε The dependent variable SANCTION takes the value one if the auditor has received a disciplinary sanction (reprimand, warning or exclusion from the profession) by SBPA and zero otherwise. Notes: *, **, *** denote p-value < 10 percent, < 5 percent, and < 1 percent, respectively, with two-tailed tests. All t-statistics in parentheses are calculated using White's (1980) method to correct for heteroskedasticity. Notes: *, **, *** denote p-value < 10 percent, < 5 percent, and < 1 percent, respectively, with two-tailed tests. All t-statistics in parentheses are calculated using clustering on auditor-in-charge to adjust for serial correlation and White's (1980) method to correct for heteroskedasticity. Notes: *, **, *** denote p-value < 10 percent, < 5 percent, and < 1 percent, respectively, with two-tailed tests. All t-statistics in parentheses are calculated using clustering on auditor-in-charge to adjust for serial correlation and White's (1980) method to correct for heteroskedasticity.
AUDIT QUALITY RELATED SANCTIONS ALL SANCTIONS
